For weeks now, the world has been transfixed by the monumental struggle in Moscow. Each day, we have seen the political threats to Russia’s fledgling democracy grow-as have the risks of a social explosion brought on by economic collapse. The fate of reform becomes more and more uncertain.
Some in the West argue for a “wait and see” policy. These advocates of inaction contend that all the Western democracies can do is wait out the political storm in Moscow.
I believe such an approach would be both dangerous and naive. It is dangerous because the stakes are critical to Western interests and values–that is, freedom and democracy. It is naive because while Western influence may be marginal, in an uncertain situation, the outcome may be determined by precisely what happens at the margin.
In broadest geostrategic terms, the collapse of Soviet communism has left the United States without a Great Power rival for the first time in half a centruy. We are far more secure primarily because Russia is democratic. Should Russia turn away from democracy, we would face a far more threatening world. Russia is still the only nation with the power to destroy the United States.
At this writing, while impeachment is not going to happen, it remains uncertain how the differences between President Yeltsin and the Parliament will ultimately end. Some of President Yeltsin’s more moderate opponents disagree not on the direction of change but on the timing. But many more are fundamentally interested in derailing reform.
The danger now is that the immediate crisis has been defused but not fundamentally resolved. This could lead to a situation of “dual powers,” where the presidency and the Parliament each asserted its own authority but neither could effectively exercise power.
The result would be continued government gridlock and increased uncertainty in Russian politics. Politics would become polarized. With decisive government action impossible, economic deterioration would accelerate even more. Most critical, the political deadlock would also increase the importance-and potential power–of the armed forces and the security services.
Across Russia, the tendency toward fragmentation and the regionalization of power would increase. With Moscow paralyzed, local bosses would seize even greater control from the center. And the autonomous republics would seek even more autonomy, perhaps complete independence. The long-term danger in this scenario is that Russia could become ungovernable and descend into even greater chaos.
In a country with thousands of nuclear weapons, the dangers of fragmentation are obvious. Centralized and unified command and control of nuclear weapons could be jeopardized.
The other major danger we face, I believe, is not a simplistic repeat of the cold war. While the ranks of Yeltsin’s opponents include many communists, Soviet communism is far too discredited among the Russian population and far too disorganized to present a viable, long-term threat.
The greater danger over the next years, if not months, is the rise of a virulent Russian nationalism, indeed what one might call fascism, that preys on the economic deprivation sweeping Russia and the psychological disorientation brought on by the end of empire. These extremists would draw their power not from what they stand for but from what they stand against: against the democrats who they argue are destroying Russia; against the capitalists who they argue are selling out Russia, and against the Westerners who they argue are doing both.
The one objective they would stand for is the return of empire, to defend the rights and even reunite the 25 million Russians who live in Kazakhstan, Ukraine, the Baltic states and the other independent states of the former Soviet Union. Anyone who cares about the freedom of Ukrainians, Estonians, Latvians, Lithuanians and the other formerly captive nations of the Soviet Union cannot easily dismiss the dangers.
The fervent hope for these anti-democratic, anti-Semitic, antimodern and anti-Western reactionaries would be to find Russia’s future in its past. That cannot be in the West’s interest.
This situation demands both short-term action and a long-term strategy.
The Western democracies have taken the right first step in throwing their full political weight behind President Yeltsin’s government and his call for a national referendum. Boris Yeltsin, after all, is the only freely elected president in Russian history. He has shown even in the face of grave personal danger that he will stand for a democratic future for Russia and against a turn to the totalitarian past.
He is well known to be an instinctive, some say impulsive, politician. Some critics question his commitment to democracy. But in my many meetings with him, I have seen his instincts at work time and time again-and they have always moved toward democratic practices, toward free markets and, above all, toward cooperation with the West.
Last June he personally crafted part of the solution to START II in a way agreeable to both the Russian and American high commands. In February 1992, on a wintry Moscow day, he told me of his commitment to free markets-a commitment he has upheld at great personal political risk ever since. And in September 1991, at the Russian White House, with the remnants of the barricades ,still standing and flowers still fresh where Russians died defending democracy, Boris Yeltsin told me in great detail of his intention to bring democracy to Russia.
Last week, he reaffirmed that commitment by calling for a vote to let the people resolve the crisis. That is a personal, courageous commitment to democracy that deserves Western support.
But a long-term strategy for advancing Western interests in Russia cannot be focused solely on support for a particular government. For governments don’t build democracy or markets. People do.
Over the next years and decades, ordinary Russian men and women will determine whether democracy and free markets succeed there. Indeed, Boris Yeltsin’s historical importance may lie precisely in his recognition that the Russian people must be unleashed if democracy and free markets are to succeed.
At the same time that we support Yeltsin and his government, we need to pursue a long-term strategy for providing Western support that is targeted at the grass roots. And that means focusing our efforts outside of Moscow and funneling assistance not through government channels but through the private sector and nongovernmental organizations. Our grass-roots efforts can help build “islands” of democracy and free markets. These regional success stories can help promote more backward areas while also serving as bulwarks against a return to totalitarianism.
With the passage last year of the FREEDOM Support Act, the new administration has the tool it needs. The Act authorizes the programs and institutions needed to channel support to the grass roots exchange and technical-assistance programs as well as the Citizens’ Democracy Corps, the Eurasia Foundation and the Peace Corp.
What needs to be done now is to find the resources to spur the volunteer and private sectors to massively step up their efforts. While the administration works with the G-7 nations and multilateral institutions to develop a multilateral aid package (which should include support for the social safety net), it should also consider whether the crisis in Russia presents us with an opportunity to transform the way America supports democracy and free markets around the world.
We all know that many government-to-government development programs don’t work well. What works is private sector investment, engagement and partnership. And that’s why the government should stimulate, not replace, private sector involvement.
That’s why I propose that consideration be given to eliminating the Agency for International Development (AID) and replacing the foreign assistance accounts with a multibillion-dollar Freedom Fund, drawn from the existing foreign-affairs budgets. Most of those funds would be set aside as grants and credits for U.S. businesses and nongovernmental organizations to provide expertise, goods and services desperately needed to build democracy and free markets not only in Russia but around the world. All of this would be done, of course, with due regard for the economic and security assistance needs of friendly and deserving countries such as Israel, Egypt and others.
By creating the Freedom Fund, the United States could help the Russian people help themselves while also enhancing American competitiveness and creating American jobs. That’s in our mutual interest. Americans have a material and moral stake in the fate of Russian democracy. At this critical moment, that is why action, not inaction, is the best course for the United States and its allies.
PHOTO: Russian nationalism is a greater danger than Soviet communism: An anti-Yeltsin demonstrator
